Introduction
What are the normative implications of higher wage flexibility of new hires? How should central banks account for the possibility that new hires may have a higher probability of wage negotiations? What are the implications of such a wage-setting heterogeneity between new workers and existing workers for an economy's reaction to macroeconomic shocks, and for the costs and benefits of alternative monetary policies? How does an optimal monetary policy change in response to different degrees of higher wage flexibility fornew hires?
Conventional monetary policy prescriptions in the presence of both price and wage stickiness was first formulated in Erceg et al (2000) , and may also be found in Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008) . The standard result of that literature states that in response to real shocks it is optimal for the central bank to allow to adjust both prices and wagesto some extent, thereby facilitating proper real wage adjustment. The degree of optimal wage and inflation volatility will depend on the relative degree of wage and price rigidity. Such a prescription became known in the literature as flexible price inflation targeting, as opposed to strict inflation targeting. Moreover, Erceg et al (2000) have shown that strict wage inflation targeting is a significantly better policy than strict price inflation targeting. It would be interesting to know how the relative wage flexibility of new hires may change the proposed policy and be considered as a benchmark policy design principle.
The first steps toward analyzing optimal monetary policy in a model containing both nominal price and wage rigidities, along with the search and matching process in the labor market, and explicit analysis of the role and consequences for unemployment were made in Thomas (2008) and Gali (2010) . Both authors come to a similar conclusion to that of Erceg et al (2000) , namelythat flexible inflation targeting is an optimal policy. Gali (2010) proposes a baseline theoretical framework that includes the necessary features required for introducing labor market frictions into the New Keynesian framework that could be used for both normative and positive analysis of monetary policy. Gali's (2010) framework is different from Thomas's (2008) modelin that it ignores capital accumulation and considers the diminishing returns of intermediate firms as a natural source of inefficiencies from staggeringwages. Another distinguishing feature of Gali's (2010) framework is that it includes the endogenous labor participation decisions of households, a property that is not usually considered in the search and matching literature and that is very natural for the New Keynesian and business-cycle literature,where the labor supply is endogenous. As a result, unemployment is determined not only by the hiring decisions offirms, but also by decisions of households regarding labor market 4 participation.The search and matching framework in the labor market assumes that there is a constant need of hiring of new workers by firms due to exogenous job destruction.
As was emphasized in Pissaridis (2009),if new hires could negotiate their wage freely at the time when they are hired, then the existence of long spells with unchanged wages of incumbent workers (but remaining in the bargaining sets) would have no direct effect on hiring decisions and, as a result, on output and employment. Still, the empirical evidence on the wage flexibility of new hires remains controversial. One group of authors (Haefke, Sontag, and van Rens,2008, and references in Pissaridis, 2009) provide evidence that confirm the hypothesis regarding the wage flexibility of new hires, while other authors,such as Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Galuscak et al (2008) ,reject the hypothesis of a significant difference in the frequencies of wage setting for new and existing workers.
Despite a lack of consensus on the degree of relative wage flexibility of new hires, it would be useful to introduce such a possibility in the standard framework and study both positive and normative implications.
The first attempt to introduce relative wage flexibility fornew hires was made in Bodart et al (2006) for the purpose of positive analysis in a medium size monetary model. The proposed model lacks the microstructurenecessary for normative analysis purposes and considers labor supply to be exogenous.
The goal of this paper is to study implications of relative wage flexibility of new hires in Gali'sbaseline model with unemployment. The main reason for considering Gali's model as a benchmark is that this model allows us to conduct both a positive and normative analysis in the presence of labor market frictions, nominal rigidities, and endogenous labor participation of households.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the baseline model combining nominal rigidities and labor market frictions. Section 3 presents calibration of the model and equilibrium reaction of macroeconomic variables in response to monetary and real shocks for different degrees of relative wage flexibility fornew hires,given the same exogenous Taylor rule with respect to the wage flexibility of new hires. In Section 4 the optimal allocationof social planner is found, welfare loss function in the presence of relative wage flexibility of new hires is derived, and a comparative analysis of optimal policy is conducted under different degrees of relative wage flexibility. Section 5 offers a conclusion. 
A model with nominal rigidities and labor market frictions
I follow the proposed baseline set-up in Gali (2010),which combines nominal rigidities and search and matching frictions in the labor market within the New Keynesian monetary framework, and extend the baseline model to explore implications fora higher relative wage flexibility of new hires.
Households
It is assumed that the economy consists of a large number of identical households. Each household consists of a continuum of members on a unit interval and maximizes the expected utility of the form
where (∫ ( ) ) isanindexofconsumedfinalgoods, is the constant elasticity of substitution between any final goods, and is an index of time spent by the household members on work and job searching. More specifically, is defined as:
( 2) where is the number of employed members of the household and is the number of involuntary unemployed members that are searching for a job. Coefficient measures the relative weight of disutility from searching for a job as compared to the disutility from work in the index of labor market effort .
Period utility function is the following
Parameters and determine labor supply, is the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and is a scaling parameter relating utility from consumption and disutility from labor market effort.
The log specification of consumption utility function is taken because it is consistent with the balanced growth path. Note, in contrast to the standard business cycle literature, where the disutility from employment is only considered, here the labor market effort of both employed and unemployed members of the household are taken into account in the utility function.
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For this specification of utility function, it is implicitly assumed that all members of the household (participating or not participating in the labor market) consume the same amount of final goods. This is possible because there is a transfer of income from employed members to members that are unemployed and not participating in the labor market. In the context of the search and matching model, such perfect risk sharing was firstly introduced by Merz (1995) .
Another implicit property of the above utility function is that non-participation in the labor market does not bring disutility to ahousehold. Any nonparticipating member has an advantage that the member does not spend time on searching for a job andhas a disadvantage of not earning wages for the household. Thus, this trade-off creates aproblem of optimal allocation of household members between participation andnon-participation in the labor market.
Aggregate employment evolves according to
where is an exogenous job destruction rate, showing a constant share of job positions that are closed every period. is a job finding rate-the probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker at the beginning of any quarter. At the end of any quarter there are unemployed workers left. Note, this timing assumption is necessary to make employment a nonpredetermined variable, whichwould be consistent with most of the business cycle literature and which differs from the search and matching literature, where each worker becomes a part ofproductive employment only in the next period after he or she was hired. Such a timing assumption was first introduced byBlanchard and Gali (2010).For a quarterly frequency, it is quite reasonable to assume that the worker becomes productive in the period of finding a job and would be irrelevant to assume thisfor a monthly frequency.
A household maximizes utility (1) in subject to the sequence of budget constraints
where ( ) is the price of final good , ( )is the wage paid to the worker employed in firm , which produces the intermediate good, is the quantity of one-quarter bonds that are bought by the household in the beginning of the quarter for price and sold back atthe end of the quarter for the price of 1, thus bringing a quarter interest rate of , is the lump sum component (e.g. dividends or taxes). Another constraint prevents households from engaging in Ponzi-type schemes.
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The resulting demand for individual final good
The familiar optimal intertemporal choice condition is represented by the Euler equation
Firms
In order to introduce both nominal price rigidities and search and matching frictions in one model, but whiletreating these features separately, a two-sector structure of the economy is There is a continuum on the unit interval of firms in the final goods sector in the economy. Each firm produces a differentiated good and sells it to households on a monopolistically competitive market. Every differentiated good is produced using the same technology: It iswell-knownthat under flexible prices, whenall firms may change their prices every period, the optimal price in the monopolistically competitive market is
i.e.the optimal price is a markup over the current period's nominal marginal costs( ) , where is a subsidy for the purchase of an intermediate good at the price .
As all firms under flexible prices will face an identical problem, they will all set the same price equal to the average price for final goods equal to
( )
It is assumed that the prices are sticky in a way proposed by Calvo (1983) . Every firm has the same probability to reset the price andthis probability is independent across the firms and time that has passed after the last price readjustment. The following log-linearized optimal pricesetting rule can be derived (details of derivation are shown in Chapter 3 of Gali, 2008)
where small letters denote logarithms of original variables, e.g. , , etc.
The condition for optimal price setting states that, under pricing restrictions a la Calvo,it is optimal to choose the price that is a desired mark-up (mark-up in an environment offlexible prices) overthe expected discounted average nominal current and future marginal costs, with the discounting factor determinedby the time preference discounting factor and the probability that the set price will remain effective in future quarters, .
Calvo pricing implies the following approximate formula for log aggregate price level
Formula (8) is a result of the assumption that in every period a share of ( ) of all firms face the same price-setting problem and choose the sameprice . As firms that reset their prices in the current quarter are chosen randomly, therefore all left firms that did not reset their price in the current quarter have anaverage price equal to the previous quarter's average price level for all firms.
The combination of equation for optimal price (7) with equation for the law of motion of aggregate price level (8)results in familiar price inflationin the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
where ,
) and ̂ ( Employment dynamics within an intermediate firm is described by equation
where is an exogenous and common for intermediate firms rate of job destruction per quarter and ( ) is the level of hiring by firm . Assumptions underlying the timing ofthis equation
were described in the section for the household problem.
As stated earlier, intermediate firms engage in the labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, meaning that the hiring process requires costs on the side of the firm to employ new workers and that the wage is not given by aWalrasianauction, but instead is bargained individually with every employee at some point in time. An important feature of this market is that each employee signs a contract specifying that the employee will receiveawage according to individual bargaining between the employee and firm with an exogenously given probability of renegotiations in the future, and that the employee may lose his or her job every quarter with an exogenously given probability of .
Labor market frictions are introduced in the form of the cost per hire , as was proposed in Blanchard and Gali (2010) . The cost per hire is the amount of resources that a firm should spend to hire one worker. It is assumed that for each individual firm is exogenous and, thus, does not depend on an individual firm's hiring level. It is commonly assumed thatfor theeconomy as a whole the cost per hire may depend on aggregate factors. One natural factor determining cost per hire is the level of labor market tightness (the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers), which can be approximated by the job finding rate (the ratio of the aggregate level of hiring during the quarter to the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of the quarter). Specifically,
It was shown in Gali (2010) that the proposed approach for introduction of labor market frictions is equivalent to the search and matching function approach developed by Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides, and described inPissaridis (2000). In short, one can derive that worker,and the latter costs are the real wage and the cost per hire minus the next quarter's expected benefit from hiring a new worker today, as there will be no need to hire an additional worker in case the position will not be destroyed with probability ( ).
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The above formula shows that, at the stage of hiring, an intermediate firm takes the following variables as exogenously given: the wage that the new workers will get in case of hiring ( ( )), the aggregate price level of final goods ( ), intermediate goods price ( ), cost per hire ( ), and the level of technology ( ). From all listed determinants, only the nominal wage ( ) that the new hired workers will get is firmspecific, as different firms may have wage bargaining in different quarters.Hence the optimal employment level is also firm specific and thus different for firms with different wages that are paid to hired or new employeesin the current quarter.
Relative wage flexibility of new hires with respect to all employees is introduced in the sense that the new hires do not necessarily sign a contract with awage equal to the wage of existing workers hired in the previous quarter. Thus, it is assumed that a portion of newly hired workers get an average wage of existing contracts of the previous period hires. That average wage is determined or "inherits" both the wage that was set for workers who worked at the time of employee negotiations, and wages of workers newly hired after company bargaining. The other portion of newly hired workers,( ), have the opportunity to conduct exclusive negotiations duringthe period of hiring. Thus, in general, the new hires have a higher probability of wage negotiations than existing employees.
First, it should be emphasized that under a higher wage flexibility of new hires, the wages of new and previously hired employees may differ within the same company and the hiring decision is based on the wages of new hires and not on previously hired workers. Thus, it is suggested to index the wage in the hiring condition (11) witha subscriptnew, stressing that the wage for new hires is considered by the firm when the hiring decision is made. Second, it is assumed that when deciding how many workers to hire the firmwill consider that the wage of an additional employee is a weighted average of the wage of existing employees hired in the previous period and newly negotiated wage with weights and ( ) , respectively. Specifically, optimal hiring condition in the extended version of the model in Gali (2010) takes the form
where ̅ ( )is an average wage of new hires, is a currently negotiated wage exclusively for new workers, ̅ ( ) is theaverage wage of new workers hired in the previous quarter.
Forward iteration of the previous equation results in
where ̅ ( ) is a notation denoting estimated wage that currently hired workers (in the quarter ) are going to get in the future quarter . The last equation states that under optimal hiring the cost per hire should be equal to the expected discounted value of the current and future differences in the real marginal revenue product and the averagewage of new hires at (or surpluses from new hires in the event thatthey are not destroyed in the future, which is accounted for by multiplying the probability of survival forcurrently newly occupied positions in the future,
It is convenient to define net hiring costs ( ) { }and simplify the hiring condition as follows
Note that the above equation implicitly contains a relation between actual markup ( ( ) ) in the final goods sector, average real wages of new hires, hiring costs, technology parameterand optimal level of employment according to the formula of ( ). Log-linearization of (13) around steady state, expression in log-deviations, and integration over all intermediate firms
where
Variables with caps denote log-deviations from steady state values, i.e. ̂ .
Log-linearization and expression in log-deviations from steady states for net hiring costs results
where the last expression in brackets uses the Euler equation for optimal intertemporal choice of consumption by the household.
From the optimal hiring condition it is straightforward to derive a relation between the relative employment of firm with respect tothe average employment in the economy and the relative 13 average wage of new hires in a firm with respect to the average wage of new hires in the economy
Monetary policy
For the purpose of positiveanalysis, the actually conducted monetary policy is described by the Taylor type rule ̂
where representsthe return for a one-quarter riskless bond and is ahousehold's time discount rate of the next quarter utility, is the quarter-to-quarter change in the price level, ̂ is the deviation of actual quarterly output from the steady state quarterly output, is an exogenous policy shifter described by an AR process with autoregressive coefficient and variance .
2.4Labor market frictions and wage determination under higher wage flexibility of new hires
Two alternative assumptions regarding wage setting are considered: cases of flexible wages and sticky wages. The case of flexible wages is defined as a situation when all workers bargain with firms over wages in every quarter. A case of sticky wages is defined as a situation when workers negotiate over wages in not every quarter. Moreover, I consider an extension to the sticky wages case proposed in Gali (2010)in whicha portion of new hires hastheopportunity toexclusivelybargainwith the firm, whereas the rest of the existing and some of the newly hired workers do not perform negotiations.
Under flexible wages, an employed worker accrues the following marginal value from his or her labor market participation
This value is measured in terms of real goods consumption and takes account for the benefit of the real wage, disutility from time spent on work ( ), and theexpected value of the employment relation for the next quarter. It is expected that with probability the 14 household member will continue work in the next quarter and with probability he or she will be unemployed and search for a new job from the beginning of the next quarter.
The marginal value from sending an additional household member to search for a job is represented by
This value takes account for the expected value of being hired during the current quarter (thisexpectation is based on the chances to be hired byfirms with potentially different levels of hiring). On the other hand, in case ahousehold member does not find the job in the current quarter, he or she creates disutility for the household due to spending time searching for a job.
The final term is the expectation of the value of remaining unemployed at the beginning of the next quarter.
In the section describing the household problemit was assumed that the household makes an optimal participation decision in the labor market. A household should choose the number ofmembers thatshould participate in the labor market, taking into account that searching for a job brings disutility and at the same time a perspective to be hired and to receive a certain level of wages, while non-participation does not bring any disutility forsearching, but also does not provide any perspective to be hired in current or future quarters.
For the sake of convenience, the value of non-participation is normalized to zero .
Assuming that a household has a positive number of both participating members and nonparticipating members, meaning thatthe solution is interior, it should be indifferent between an alternative to send an additional worker to the labor market or to ask the member to stay at home.
That implied, the optimal participation condition is satisfied when . Applying this condition for the marginal value for an unemployed worker gives the following relation
The relation means that the household will send members to search for a job to the point when the marginal disutility from the job search would be equalized with the expected benefit from employment. Therefore, the surplus accruing to the household (defined as the difference between the marginal values of employed and unemployed workers) is
where ( ) .
Similarly, the surplus for a firm that shows the marginal value accruing to the firm from marginal employees is
The firm's surplus takes account of the benefit of the real marginal revenue product that is created by the marginal employee and the cost of paying the real wage to the worker and expected future surpluses if the position will not be destroyed with probability ( ) Note that firm's surplus does not include hiring costs, as the surplus is calculated for existing positions, when the worker is already hired and thus the cost per hire has already been paid.
The minimum wage when employment is beneficial ( ( ) ) for the household is
The maximum wage when hiring is beneficial is
The difference between the maximum possible wage and minimum possible wage represents the sum of surpluses accruing to the household and the firm.
It is assumed that firms and household members engage in the Nash bargaining and the resulting bargained wage is a solution for the following problem
where is the bargaining power of the firm and is the bargaining power of the household member.
The optimal sharing rule is ( ) ( ) ( ) and the Nash bargained wage is
The above expression states that bargained wages represent a weighted average of the current quarter marginal rate of substitution and the marginal revenue product from additional hiring, with weights corresponding to bargaining powers.
As all employees and firms face the same Nash bargaining problem in the same quarter thatthe wages are negotiated every quarter by all employees, all negotiations will result in the same wage (
) if the real marginal products are identical for all firms. Given that the wages are identical, the hiring decision rule implies the same level of employment for all firms and thus the same level of marginal revenue product ( ( ) ). Therefore, satisfaction of both the optimal hiring condition and Nash bargaining condition results in
Combining the previous Nash bargaining wage condition with the optimal hiring condition gives
Combining the Nash bargaining condition with the optimal participation condition for households and optimal hiring condition gives
Note that the optimal hiring condition defines relation for coinciding with the relation for ( )= .Thus it is always the case that the surplus the firm gets from hiring is equal to the cost per hire, that is common for all firms. Using the sharing rule to express the household's surplus as a function of the firm's surplus from hiring givesthe results in (24).
An extension of the sticky wages model proposed byGali (2010) is considered below. As in Gali (2010) I assume sticky wages forexistingworkers or workers hired in previous quarters a la Calvo, when for every existing employment relation there is a probability of for wage negotiations in every quarter, which is independent across employment contracts and time passed after the last negotiation. The relative wage flexibility of new hires is introduced by the assumption that a portion of of new employees can renegotiate their wage even if it happened such that existing employees did not bargain the wage in the current quarter.
The marginal value of an employed member of ahousehold is
where | is the marginal value of an additional employed member of the household in quarter given that the last negotiations happened k quarters ago in quarter .
The marginal value of an unemployed member of the household in the beginning of quarter is
As previously under condition of optimal participation ( ), the household's surplus for quarter t+k given that the last wage negotiation took place k quarters ago is
The marginal value for the unemployed worker under optimal participation implies
It is straightforward to get a solution to (26) by forward iteration for the case when negotiations happen in the same quarter ( )
A firm's surplus from amarginal employee is
The expectations of continuation value are based on the probabilities of overall employee renegotiations in the next quarter.
As in the case of flexible wages, the definition of | above coincides with the expression for under optimal hiring conditions, thus under optimal hiring | Forward iteration of (29) when the wage is set in the same quarter gives the solution
The Nash bargaining problem under sticky wages is the following
Substituting expressions for surpluses into optimal sharing condition gives
Log-linearization of optimal sharing rule (30) results in
In contrast to the case of flexible wageswhere the Nash bargained wage should always be equal to the current period target wage, in the case of sticky wages the Nash bargained wage is an average of the current and future quarter target wages with the discount factor being a function of the next quarter utility discount factor , the probability that the job contract will not be exogenously destroyed is and the probability that the current bargained wage will be effective next quarter is Log-linearization of (32) gives (34) where ( ) . Note that the target wage is calculated for every period for each employment relation, but it does not mean that the employee negotiates a wage for every period.For example, ̂ | is the target wage in quarter and the last negotiations for this employment contract was k quarters ago in . The above equation states that the targeted wage is different for two employment contracts if their last negotiations happened indifferent periods and should be the same if the previousnegotiations happened in the same period.
It is possible to define an average target wage for the economy as a whole by integrating (34) over all intermediate firms. According to (34),such an average level of target wage corresponds to the targeted wage for a firm with an average level of employment in the economy
Subtracting (35) from (34) gives a relation of the relative target wage with respect to the average target wage in the economy to relative employment with respect to average employment in the
Combining previous relation and relative employment demand (16),a relation of the relative target wage with respect to average target wage in the economy to relative average wage of new hires with respect to average wage of new hires in the economy is obtained
The derivation of the last equation is made in Appendix A.
Notethat for an extension of Gali (2010) in the form of introducing relative wage flexibility of new hires, it is stressed that relative employment is determined not by the average wage of all workers in a firm, but by the average wage of new hired workers in afirm.
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By substituting thetargeted wage equation (36) into the Nash optimal sharing rule wage equation (33), and after several algebraic manipulations, the following expression is derived for the Nash bargained wage. (Sketches of derivations are shown in Appendix B.) (37) where
As shown in Appendix C, the average wage of new hires for the economy as a whole will evolve according to
Combining equations for the Nash bargained wage (37) and for the average wage of new hires in the economy (38) gives wage inflation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve derived in the environment of a search and matching model with sticky nominal wages allowing for heterogeneity in the wage flexibility of newly hired and existing employees.
where ̅ ̅ measures the inflation of wages for new hires and ̅ ̅ measures the real average wages of new hires.
Participation condition of the household expressed in log-deviations from a steady state is
. The derivation of participation conditions assuming a higher wage flexibility of new hires is shown in Appendix D.
Aggregate demand and output
The hiring costs are in the form of a bundle of final goods with elasticity of substitution, coinciding with a consumer's elasticity of substitution . Thus, the production of each final good 21 is not only consumed by the households, but also by the firms in order to hire new workers. In this case, the demand for final good is ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ), where ∫ ( ) .
The aggregate output is defined as (∫ ( ) ) , which results in (41) Note that aggregate demand evolves according to the Euler equation for consumption and the hiring decisions of firms and the cost per hire.
On the supply side, one can determine the following relation between aggregate intermediate good production and aggregate final good output
where ∫ ( ( ) ) reflects efficiency losses resulting from unequal consumption and production of final goods.
The supply of intermediate goods represents the integrated supply of individual firms
where ∫ ( ( ) ) , capturing efficiency losses from the unequal production of intermediate goods under decreasing returns technology.
Note that the variation in prices and wages is a result of a staggering assumption of the Calvo price and wage setting. In the case where the prices may be adjusted in a synchronized way, technology and preferences imply equal prices goods and wages of all employees.
Combination of previous conditions (42) and (43) Table 1 .
Goods market clearing condition inthe steady state (45) Optimal hiring condition inthe steady state
A household's optimal participation condition inthe steady state
Definition of job finding rate and time spent on labor market activities Source: Gali (2010) As the main purpose of the paper isnormative analysis, I consider the baseline calibration that is consistent with efficient steady state,in as much asfor that case the quadratic approximation of welfare losses is a reliable technique for optimal monetary policy analysis.
3.2The effects of monetary policy and technology shocks
In this section the effects of the monetary and technological shocks are studied under different degrees of relative wage flexibility of new hires with parameter taking 4 different values, indicating abaseline case of no relative wage flexibility fornew hires ( ), which corresponds completely to the baseline model of Gali (2010), a moderate and high degree of relative wage flexibility fornew hires ( and , accordingly) and case of completely flexible wages fornew hires as compared to the wages of existing workers ( ).
24 Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of a 0.25-percentage-point increase in the quarterly interest rate (whichis equivalent to a 1-percentage-point increase of an annualized interest rate) on six macro variables. The monetary policy shock is described by an autoregressive process with adegree of persistence and standard deviation of 0.0025. Figure 1 indicatesthat both the unemployment rate and employment volatility -and thus labor force volatility -is reduced with the introduction of a higher wage flexibility fornew hires. The intuitive explanation is that higher wage flexibility in the case of a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a quicker downward adjustment of wages, whichdiscourages participation in the labor market and thus reduces labor market effort and unemployment. Employment reduction becomes slightly less, as with a higher wage flexibility of new hires comes a higher share of employment contracts, which is characterized by renegotiated wages at level that islower thanthe level before the contractionary shock. Note that inflation volatility increases slightly in the short-run, which is explained by a higher volatility of the price markup caused by stronger reaction of more flexible wages for new hires, as was demonstrated in (14). In this case, introducing a higher wage flexibility of new hires reduces the unemployment rate volatility, while the effect on employment volatility depends on the degree of wage flexibility of new hires. In case of relatively low degree of relative wage flexibility of new hires ( ) the employment volatility reduces and then increases as the degree of relative wage flexibility is higher (for and ). The labor force volatility is reduced unambiguously with the introduction of higher wage flexibility.
The intuition of obtained results is asfollows. As the wage of new hires becomes relatively more flexible in the short-run,wages becomes higher than in the more baseline case( ), but, at the 26 same time, it becomes less persistent. As the agents are forward looking, it means that a shortrun increase in wages is not enough to increase labor market participation, given that in the medium and long-run the wage is systematically lower than for the baseline case( ). As forthe hiring decision, as it is seen in the Figure 2 , firms expect lower wages in the medium-and long-run, when the wages are more flexible, and hire more as compared to the baseline case of .
Figure 2. The effects of expansionary technology shocks
Note that in the exercises above the implications of changes in the degree of wage flexibility of new hires are examined for the macroeconomic equilibrium reaction to the shocksallelse being equal, including the same monetary policy rule (the Taylor type rule describe earlier). In later 27 sections it will be shownthat for each level of relative wage flexibility of new hires, the central bank follows optimal monetary policy that itself depends on the relative wage flexibility of new hires.
Labor market frictions, nominal rigidities, and monetary policy design 4.1The social planner's problem
The following problem is faced by the social planner who maximizes a representative household's utility ∑ ( ) subject to the resource constraint and definitions of time spent on labor activities, hiring, and the job-finding rate
Note that the social planner is able to internalize the impact of hiring participation decisions on the job finding rate and, as a consequence, on the cost per hire. Firms and households, who considered the probability of hiring as being fully exogenous, ignored that effect.
The optimal hiring (or employment) condition according to the social planner's problem
Optimal participation (or the level of unemployment) according to the social planner's problem
Two previous optimality conditions when considered at the steady state give an optimal steady state for hiring and participation levels
Note that the optimal hiring condition (46) and participation condition (47) in the decentralized market equilibrium when considered at steady state coincide with the planner's solutions (50) and (51) under the following conditions
This relation states that in an efficient steady state the market power of firms in thefinal good sector should be completely offset be the subsidy on purchases of intermediate goods.
The above relation is called a Hosios condition and is presented in the same form as in Blanchard and Gali (2010) 
where ̃ and ̃ denote gaps of output and unemployment with regard to constrained efficiencylevels or natural levels, 
Conclusions
A higher wage flexibility fornew hires was introduced as an extension of the baselinemodel in
Gali ( the bargaining process that is determined by the probability of overallemployee negotiations and the exogenous probability of job destruction. Although the planning horizon of negotiations remained the same as in the baseline model of Gali (2010) , the present value of the future marginal revenue of products (that determines the expected targeted wages for negotiations) has changed as a result of the fact thatsome part of future new employees will be hired at a renegotiated wage, while existing workers may not renegotiate their wages for long time.
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It was emphasized that the wages of new hires, as opposed to wages of all existing workers, determine the welfare losses from staggered adjustment of wages, and the welfare loss function was derived taking into account the degree of the relative wage flexibility of new hires, calibrated with parameter .
The optimal monetary policy in the presence ofa higher wage flexibility of new hires is modified to capture a higher incentive to make inflation more stable, therebyignoring the incentive to (36) into Nash optimal sharing rule wage equation (33) gives
The above expression is a solution to the following difference equation with expectations
Additional algebraic manipulations allow us to write the above equation in terms of differences of the type ̂ ̅ for
Using the relation between wage inflation and average wages ̂ ̅ ̂ ( ) whichis a reformulated version of (38) in terms of the wage inflation rate, the following modified New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve is derived 
Appendix C. Derivation of the economy's average wage of new hires
By analogy with the standard Calvo model,the evolution of the distribution of wages in a new setting with a higher flexibility of new wages is derived here.
For each period after a shock (when all wages are not equal and do not represent a steady state atom value) the distribution { ̅ ( )} may be described by some pdf function ( ̅ ).
Then the share of firms represents an atom in ( ̅ ), with all firms that readjust the wage set it equal value of ̅ . There is a share of of such firms in the entiredistribution of firms.
Then the remainingshare of firms fix the share of new wages at a level that wasset during the last their overall employee negotiations and conduct new negotiations with ( ) new workers. Thus, the mean value of the wage of new hires is ̅ ̅ ( ) and the average wage for new hires changes (or wage inflationof new hires)
which is equivalent to (38)
Appendix D. Participation condition under higher wage flexibility of new hires
The log-linearization of (27) 
Substituting the expression obtained above into gives
A relation between the average wage and wage inflation is derived:
Thus,
̅ ( )
Approximate relation holds
As a result
Finally, the first-orderapproximation of the above expression gives
( )
Thus,the log-linearized optimal participation condition is 
